In this paper we study the life cycle labour force participation of three cohorts of American women: those born in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. We rst document the large shifts in labour supply behaviour among these three cohorts as well as changes in some likely determinants of labour supply. Our focus is on the increase in the labour supply of mothers between the 1940s and 1950s cohorts. We construct a life cycle model with endogenous female labour force participation, consumption and saving choices to search for an explanation. The dynamics of labour supply depends on child costs (relative to earnings), returns to experience and the rate of depreciation of human capital when out of the labour market.
Introduction
Female labour force participation and labour supply, in the US, as in many other developed countries, has changed dramatically over the last 30 years. If one contrasts the labour supply behaviour of the cohorts of women born in the 1930s (such as Elizabeth Dole), 1940s (Hillary Clinton) and 1950s (Oprah Winfrey) in its various dimensions, two main features emerge. First, comparing the Elizabeth Dole cohort to the Hillary Clinton one, we can see a substantial shift of the age pro le of labour supply: the Clinton cohort worked more than the Dole cohort. However, the shape of the age pro le does not change much. In particular, in both pro les we observe low participation (relative to other ages) corresponding to child rearing years. When comparing the Hillary Clinton cohort with the Oprah Winfrey one, we see that the low participation rates associated with the \fertility years" are no longer present. The aim of this paper is to construct a life cycle model of labour supply and saving that could explain these dramatic changes and, in particular, the di erence between the Clinton and Winfrey cohorts. We explore the extent to which realistic changes to some speci c parameters and exogenous variables of this model can generate the patterns observed in the data. Or, to use a di erent perspective, we want to quantify the size of changes in these variables that would be needed to explain the observed patterns.
We build a model of the participation and savings decisions of households across the life-cycle and calibrate this model by matching simulated participation and wage pro les to observed participation and wage pro les. The main change in female labour supply behavior in the data is on the extensive margin. For this reason, we focus on participation choices. Households are able to save and borrow and women choose whether or not to work. Decisions are taken at an annual frequency. In our life cycle model households face uncertainty about wife's wages and husband earnings; maternity is exogenously given and children impose some monetary xed cost when mothers decide to work. In the model returns to experience are a result of participation and of the depreciation of human capital when labor market interruptions are made. There is no exogenous aggregate productivity growth, nor are wages determined in equilibrium. Human capital is accumulated only through participation in the labour market. However, observed average wages are endogenous, as they result both from the selection process that induces some women to work and others to stay out of the labour force in the current period and the selection process that operated in the past.
The ability of households to save and to borrow makes our model di erent from Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) , van Der Klaauw (1996) and Francesconi (2002) who estimate structural models of females' employment decision in the rst case and females' employment and marital status decisions in the second and third cases imposing that consumption coincides with income. Without the saving choice, the only way to substitute consumption intertemporally would be through changing labor supply and hence, in a model with returns to experience, the future wage rate. Saving is potentially a more exible tool for intertemporal substitution and therefore ignoring it might overstate the importance of labor supply choices in life-cycle smoothing.
To calibrate the parameters of our model, we use observed pro les from the cohort born at the start of the 1940s (cohort 2). We explore the role of di erent factors in shaping the participation age pro le and the age wage pro le. The latter will be shaped by the fact that a selected set of women work. Having built a model that represents well the behaviour of the Clinton cohort, we experiment with changes in the basic determinants of labour supply to determine which are more likely to yield the pro les of the cohort born in the 1950s. We consider a number of possible determinants of changes in participation. First, the xed cost of participating for mothers might have fallen relative to female wages. For example, the costs of child-care may have fallen. Second, on-the-job learning or the return to experience may have increased. As argued by Olivetti (2001) , this increases the opportunity cost of reduced labor supply. Third, the overall level of female wages might have increased. Finally, we also discuss other possibilities, such as an increase in the age of mothers at childbirth and a decrease in the total number of children. Our structural model of life-cycle behavior attempts to evaluate these alternative explanations.
The facts on employment are not in dispute and have been described before. For instance, Pencavel (1998) and Coleman and Pencavel (1993) report age pro les for participation similar to those we present. More controversial is understanding the data on wage pro les and on depreciation of human capital, as well as the underlying question of why participation has changed.
Obviously, wages are likely to be an important determinant of female labour supply. However, by looking at observed wages alone, it is di cult to disentangle the return to experience, the depreciation rate of human capital and the extent to which observed average wages are a ected by participation bias (selection). Moreover, the interactions of these e ects with other important determinants (such as fertility patterns, the cost of children, uncertainty, and so on) even in a simple life cycle model can be quite complex and di cult to quantify. Mincer and Polachek (1974) and Mincer and Olfek (1982) discuss the extent of human capital depreciation under di erent assumptions on the persistence of depreciation. We report some statistics that are relevant for the depreciation of human capital when out of the labour force showing that rates of wage depreciation appear to have increased. However, without a tightly speci ed structural model of participation it is hard to identify separately the depreciation rate from the participation choice.
Olivetti (2000) suggests that changes in wage pro les across cohorts re ect a change in the return to experience. The evidence we present is somewhat weaker: rst, the cohort e ect which leads to an increase in the return to experience can plausibly be interpreted as a year e ect with wages in the 1980s growing faster than in previous periods. Second, wage growth seems to have bene ted those who have worked only intermittently as well as those who have worked full time.
There is now a substantial literature addressing the underlying question of why participation has changed. For example, Olivetti (2001) uses a four period model and the estimates of the returns to experience in Olivetti (2000) to show the e ect that increases in the returns to experience have on hours worked by women. Greenwood and Seshadri (2002) measure the impact of technological progress on the increase in women's participation, while Greenwood et al. (2005) focus on the role played by changes in home production (with the development and di usion of many household appliances) in explaining the increased labour force participation of women. Jones, Manuelli and McGrattan (2003) investigate the e ect on average hours worked by women of the decrease in the wage gender gap as well as the e ect of technological progress. Caucutt, Guner and Knowles (2001) explore the interaction between wage inequality, marriage, fertility and employment decisions of young women emphasising the importance of the timing of children for participation decisions.
The contribution of the current paper is primarily to use a realistic life-cycle model of saving and participation to compare alternative explanations. Relative to other contributions, we focus on the changes in the labour supply behaviour of mothers belonging to the cohort of women born in the 1950s relative to that born in the 1940s. In this sense, our paper can be seen as a complement to some of the contributions above. Our main conclusion is that the decrease in child care costs that we report in the data explain convincingly much of the change in female participation between the two cohorts. Explaining the change in participation by an increase in the level of wages would similarly capture the changes in the aggregate statistics, but does not match the changes in participation for disaggregated groups. In particular, changes in participation for all women increases rather than predominantly being an increase in participation of mothers. There are aspects of the change across cohorts that we are not able to explain. The main limitation is that we cannot explain the increased wage growth across cohorts without recourse to an aggregate time e ect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data that motivates the paper, in particular female employment behavior. We describe the behaviour of three cohorts: those of women born in the 30s, 40s, and 50s. In Section 3, we describe the model and we compare it with the literature. In section 4, we discuss how we calibrated the parameters of the model and report results for our`baseline' simulations, meant to describe the behaviour of the cohort of women born in the 1940s. In section 5 we carry out comparative statics exercises for the variables we think are the main candidates to explain the changes in female labour force participation. In Section 6, we discuss the implications of our exercise and conclude the paper.
Data
The aim of this section is to illustrate the main facts about female labour supply and about a number of variables that are likely to be important determinants of labour supply choices. Clearly, as we discuss below, some of these variables could be jointly determined with labour supply either at the individual levelsuch as fertility -or in a general equilibrium setting, such as wages.
The main data sources we use is the PSID. In particular, we use the PSID core sample, including the SEO low income sample. In all our computations we use the PSID weights. As the focus of this paper is a life cycle model, we follow three di erent cohorts of women over the observed part of their life cycle. The rst cohort is made up of women born between 1934 and 1938 and is therefore observed between (median) ages of 35 and 60. The second cohort contains women born between 1944 and 1948 and is observed between ages 25 and 50, and the third cohort contains those women born between 1954 and 1958 and is observed between ages 25 to 40. Sample sizes are reported in Table 12 in the Appendix. While we do not observe the complete life cycle pro les for each cohort, each cohort overlaps, at some ages, with the others. With the important caveat that di erent cohorts are obviously observed at the same age at di erent points in time, these overlaps can be informative about possible di erences in life cycle pro les. On the other hand, we should keep in mind the impossibility of disentangling, without additional information, year, age and cohort e ects.
We concentrate on married women. It is well known that the key factor underlying the increase of female employment in the US over the last decades is the change of married women's behavior. The main issue is whether the increases in single women and single mothers and the trend towards marrying later might a ect or bias our results: changes in participation across cohorts may re ect composition changes rather than changes in behaviour. This selection into marriage (and out of marriage) is not part of our model and its importance remains an open question. We start our descriptive analysis with labour supply variables. We then move on to wages and to other variables, such as fertility, child care arrangements and so on, that might be relevant for labour supply choices.
Facts to explain: Employment
We start our analysis by looking at the life cycle pro les of hours worked. In Figure 1 , we plot average hours worked for the three cohorts, averaging over both workers and non workers. In this gure we rst see a pattern that we observe repeatedly. Two features stand out. First, there is a large increase across cohorts in the number of hours worked by women, especially if we compare the rst and third cohort. Second, the di erence in the life cycle pro le between the second and third cohort: whilst the di erence between the two cohorts is quite large early in the life cycle when participation is much higher for the third cohort, by age 37 the di erence between the two cohorts is minimal.
1
In Figure 2 , we report average hours worked by women who work. We observe that di erences across cohorts are much smaller now, suggesting that the main change in women's labour supply behaviour is in participation decisions. This supposition is con rmed in Figures 3 and 4 which refer to employment rates and full time employment rates respectively. In the former case a woman is classi ed as employed if she works at least 100 hours per year, while in the latter she is considered working full time if she works at least 1,500 hours per year. Both gures show large di erences in employment rates across the di erent cohorts. Again, it is interesting to note that the main di erences between cohorts 2 and 3 are observed from age 25 to age 35. For cohort 2, employment rates are low but increasing from age 25 to age 35, corresponding to child rearing years. However, for the youngest cohort, participation rates are less correlated with women's age.
Next, we focus on the early part of the life cycle and relate labour supply behaviour to fertility behaviour. In Figures 5 and 6 , we plot employment rates and full time employment rates for mothers of children younger than 3. As from age 35 on there are very few observations, we restrict our comparison to ages 25 to 35 so we only have observations for cohorts 2 and 3.
The di erence between the two cohorts is remarkable. In cohort 3 as many as 65% of mothers with a child less than 3 are working, while the same gure for cohort 2 is only 47%. This evidence is consistent with some facts reported by the US Census Bureau, reproduced in gure 7. They consider women who 1 It is possible that the increases in participation that we show here are due to year e ects, with participation simply being higher in more recent years. This explanation would suggest that wages were higher for the youngest cohort in the early years of working life than for older cohorts. We show in gure 8 below that real wages are, if anything, lower for the younger cohort. Figure 7 shows that the rst two cohorts were unlikely to have returned to the labor market a year after birth. However, for the two youngest cohorts employment rates three months after childbirth are similar to those two months before.
The women belonging to the three cohorts we are studying are very di erent in many dimensions. A very important one is their education achievements. The members of the youngest cohort are much more educated than their predecessors: in the Current Population Survey, only 20% of the women belonging to our cohort 1 had more than high school education. This percentage increased to 26% for the second cohort and to 41% for the third cohort. It could be the case that part of the observed increase in women employment rates was due to a composition e ect. However, when re-doing the exercise for di erent education groups, we nd that the trends just discussed can be observed at di erent education levels. This does not imply that changes in education attainment are not part of the explanation through a composition e ect, but it does suggest that there is behavioural change for both education groups. We report the evidence on labour supply (and wages) by education in the Appendix. Figures 5 and 6 showed the importance of the changes in the behaviour of mothers in explaining the di erent participation rates of cohorts 2 and 3. To complement that evidence, in Table 1 we compute, for cohorts 2 and 3, the percentage of women who exit from the labour market for each age between 26 and 32. The table shows that a smaller fraction of cohort 3 women exit the labour market at each age. Once out of the labour market, women belonging to the two cohorts also di er in terms of the amount of time they stay out of the labour market. In Table 1 we report the median duration of time out of the labour market by age of exit for women who return to work by age 40 and also for all women who exit (ie including those who we do not observe returning). We also include duration statistics pooling together all women who exit at or before age 32. Finally, we report the fraction of women who return to the labor market before age 40. Conditioning on exit, women in cohort 3 return to work somewhat faster than cohort 2, but the di erence is small. The main di erence between cohorts is in the rate of exit.
Wages
The price of human capital is obviously determined in equilibrium by the interaction of demand and supply of the relevant factors. For an individual, however, it could be argued that the path of wages is given. As we discuss in the next section, current wages are not the only important determinant of the participation decisions in a life time framework. Dynamic aspects, such as the return to experience and the depreciation of human capital when not participating in the labour market are also likely to be important determinants. For this reason, in this section we look at the life cycle pro le of wages for our three cohorts of women. While life cycle pro les for wages are informative about the return to human capital for women who work, two important caveats should be kept in mind when looking at these pictures and thinking about the role wages could play in determining participation. First, it is not clear whether the observed pro le was actually rationally predicted by the decision makers at the time the labour supply decision was made. We already mentioned the existence of macro e ects: a future increase (or stagnation) in wages for a given cohort is not necessarily anticipated. Second, the pictures we construct do not necessarily re ect the average (or median) o er wage, which is the one relevant for the decision: selection into employment is not random and can induce important biases. Figure 8 plots for each of the three cohorts, the median female hourly wage against age. In the Appendix we report similar pictures for di erent education groups. Cohort 3 appears to face a much steeper wage pro le in the early part of the life-cycle than cohort 2. This may be interpreted as an increase in the return to experience. However, it is di cult to separate out the cohort and year e ects. In particular, all three pro les of wages exhibit sizeable increases in the second half of our sample period. During the rst half of the sample, which covers the 1970s and for which we only observe cohort 1 and 2, real wages were basically at. By the time cohort 3 comes in, and starts enjoying relatively fast growth of real wages, the wages of cohort 1 and 2 also start increasing. Of course the three cohorts experience these changes in real wages at di erent ages. To stress how di cult it is to interpret these patterns, in Figure 9 we plot median wages for the three cohorts against time, rather than age. The synchronization in the dynamics of the wages for the three cohorts apparent in this picture might suggest we should attribute all or part of the increase in wages to aggregate factors that move the wages of women belonging to all cohorts.
In addition to the impossibility of disentangling age, time and cohort e ects, the life cycle pro les in Figure 8 are only partially informative about the return to experience because at each age we average the wages of women with di erent levels of labour market experience. In order to have additional information on the returns to experience we plot, for each cohort, two life cycle wage pro les. At each age we compare the wage of all women with the wage of those women who have been observed since age 25 and have been not had more than one year o work. These two pro les, plotted in Figure 10 , are observed from Figure 9 : Log of Median Wage by Year age 26 to age 39 and give an idea of the return to experience faced by these cohorts. Computing the`return to experience' as the di erence between these two pro les has an important advantage relative to the pro les in Figure 8 and some drawbacks. The advantage is that, to a certain extent, year e ects are common to the two pro les and might be`di erenced out'. However, we do not take into account the duration of spells out of the labour force and we know these to be shorter for cohort 3. Moreover, we ignore selection (and possible changes in it). Perhaps surprisingly, in these gures we do not nd very strong di erences in this particular measure of return to experience between cohort 2 and 3. Since the pro les in Figure 10 are obviously a ected by the interaction of the selection in and out of employment, changes in productivity and depreciation, they cannot be used formally to disentangle the various factors at play. A potentially important determinant of the participation decision is the depreciation of human capital when out of the labour force. A clean estimate of a depreciation model is remarkably hard because of the selection problems involved: one only observes the wage of women who decide to go out and then to come back. There will be women who have not gone out because of the depreciation and, more importantly, women who have not come back because of the extent to which their human capital had depreciated. Without a structural model of participation, it is not possible to solve these selection issues. Nonetheless, in this section we look at what happens to the wages of women who have exited the labour market and decided to reenter after an interruption, and return to calibrating the depreciation rate in section 3. Our exercise is similar to the one performed by Mincer and Polachek (1974) and Mincer and Olfek (1982) . In particular, we follow women who have employment interruptions and who are observed before and after the interruption. In Table 2 , we report the average level of wages before and after the interruption for these two cohorts, as well as median depreciation. The last row includes depreciation rates for all women who exit at or before age 32. We calculate an exponential depreciation rate
where k is the duration of an exit that began in period t: This calculation controls for the shorter duration of unemployment observed in cohort 3 that was reported in table 2. Median depreciation rates are marginally higher for Cohort 3 than in cohort 2, but sample sizes are small. Further, we do not know how long the depreciation lasts on return to work. We are of course aware of the limitations of these measures. In particular, there is a selection bias that can give misleading returns to experience and penalty of employment interruptions. For example, if returns to experience are greater in the younger cohort, then individuals may be more willing to su er an initial wage loss on return to work.. The depreciation rate for a particular individual is calculated as = (1= )(lnw t+k lnwt) where k is the duration of an exit which occured in period t. We then calculate median over individuals by age. Negative numbers for indicate wage growth.
Fertility and child care arrangements
Fertility behaviour is obviously important for labour supply decisions, either as a determinant or as a joint decision variable. The cost of children can be an important indirect determinant of labour supply decisions. In Figure 11 , we plot the average number of children aged less than 17 present in the household against their mother's age. From the gure the massive decline in fertility is apparent: at age 35 a woman of cohort 1 had on average 3 children living with her, while at the same age a woman belonging to cohort 3 had less than 2. As with labour supply, however, the di erence between cohort 2 and 3 is much less pronounced and, by age 40, the two pro les overlap. This suggests that the di erence in fertility behaviour between cohort 2 and 3 is in the timing, rather than the number of children. As in other developed countries, the reduction in the number of children happened at the same time as a delay in the birth of the rst child. Using the PSID 1993 additional fertility module, we can calculate, for each of our three cohorts, the proportion of women who have their rst child in any given age interval. The numbers reported in Table 3 are revealing: in cohorts 1 and 2, 30% of women had their rst child between 18 and 22; this percentage falls to 26% for cohort 3. On the other hand, while only 29% of cohort 1 women had their rst child when aged over 26, that percentage goes up to 37% for cohort 2 and to 41% for cohort 3. These proportions are similar to the data from the National Vital Statistics System published by the US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS, 1989). Above, we have stressed that the main di erence in the labour supply of cohort 2 and 3 females lies in the increase of mothers' employment. It is therefore worthwhile looking at the cost and availability of child care arrangements. Before doing so, however, we should also consider whether the opportunity of returning to the same job exists. The introduction of legislation to ensure maternity leave in the US is very recent. It took place in 1993 when the Family and Medical Leave Act was approved. Even then, the approved period of maternity leave was 12 weeks, the lowest among OECD countries and does not mandate paid bene ts during the period. The availability of maternity periods allows women time out of the labour force around childbirth without compelling them to quit their jobs. Indeed, as shown in gure 7, the increase in maternity leave is associated with women returning to work after child birth more quickly.
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Child Care costs can be substantial, as documented by Schulman (2000) , who reports data of child care costs in the 50 US states. In 1999, according to the Child Care Bureau of the US Department of Health and Human Services, Child Care costs varied between $300 and $700 per month per child. In certain areas of the country these costs could be even higher, especially for families with infants, whose cost is substantially higher than that of children aged more than 3.
3 What we are interested in is how much these costs have changed in relation 2 A further issue that could a ect married women's employment decision is the risk of divorce. When married women face uncertainty on their future marital status and the accumulation of labor market experience has a return in terms of higher future wages, they have an additional incentive to participate in the labor market. to the potential earnings of women.
To provide evidence on the dynamics of child care costs relative to female earnings, we consider both detailed information on child care expenditure that can be obtained from the BLS Consumer Expenditure Survey, and indirect evidence on the unit cost of child care.
The CEX collects detailed information on consumption expenditure by US households. Unfortunately it is only available since 1980 on a consistent basis. 4 We consider households observed between 1980-1984 and between 1998-1999, where the reference person or the spouse is a working woman with children between 0 and 7. We construct the ratio of child cost expenditure to female earnings and run a Tobit regression of this ratio on the log of the annual number of hours worked, the number of children between 0 and 3 and the number of children between 4 and 7 years of age. In addition to these variables, we introduce a dummy for the late 1990s year. In Table 4 we report the results of two regressions: the rst for mothers with at least one child aged 0 to 3, the second for mothers with at least one child aged 4 to 7. Notice that the two samples are partly overlapping. In both columns we see that the coe cient on the late 1990s is signi cantly negative, indicating a decline in the ratio of child care costs to women earnings, even after controlling for di erences in the number of hours worked. The decline is particularly large for younger children. A similar exercise can be executed in the PSID. If we compare the ratio of child care cost to women earnings in 1975 and 1988 we nd that, conditional on having positive costs, the ratio is considerably higher in 1975 than 1988, even after controlling for the number of hours and number of children.
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Direct evidence on the cost of child care, especially historically, is di cult to obtain. Some insights on the evolution of these costs can be obtained by considering the wages of child care workers. According to O'Neill and O'Connell (2001) employees in child care establishments have fared very poorly over the past 20 years. Figure 12 reproduces data from the US Census Bureau on payroll costs for employees working in the child care sector. The average payroll dollars per employee in 1997 was $11,076, which is $548 less than in 1977 (in 1997 dollars). This fall of about 5% comprises an initial fall of about 15% that occurred between 1977 and 1982, followed by a partial recovery. Further, between 1982 and 1997, in the economy-wide recovery of wages after the high in ation period at the end of the 1970s, wages for all female workers increased by 79% (from $13,366 to $16,849) compared with the 11% increase (from $9,690 to $11,076) A possible explanation for the decline in child care cost is discussed in Ferrero and Iza (2002) who argue that recent skill-biased technological change, which implies an increase of the skill premia and a relative decrease in the market price of child-caring with respect to female mean wages, could contribute to explaining the increase in women's employment rate.
Another indication of the`cost' of child care is its`availability'. 
Model
In this section we describe the model we use to explain the changes in female labour supply. We assume that unitary households maximize expected lifetime utility. The utility function is intertemporally separable and instantaneous utility depends on household consumption per adult equivalent and the labour supply choice of the wife. We assume that all households have two adults who remain married and that husbands always work and receive earnings that are determined by a stochastic process introduced below. We do not model fertility choices. However, we calibrate the arrival of children to make it similar to what we observe in the data. We assume that there are three types of women in our model. The rst type never has any children, the second and third type both have two children, with the second child arriving two years after the rst. However, the second type of women have their rst child at 24, while the third type have theirs at 29. We will label these two groups as 'young' and 'older' mothers. We assume that there is no correlation between productivity (male or female wages) and fertility types. Children do not have a direct e ect on utility (except for de ating consumption by their adult equivalent). However, they do a ect the xed cost of work.
In particular, we consider an individual household with an instantaneous utility function of the form u t = u(c t ; P t ; e t ) where P t is a discrete f0; 1g female labour supply choice, c t is total household consumption and e t is the number of adult equivalents in the household. The household is assumed to maximize lifetime expected utility, max c;P
where is the discount factor and E t the expectations operator conditional on information available in period t: We consider a retirement period after which neither of the members of the household participate in the labor market and the household receives a pension proportional to the husband's earnings after make up for in ation. Family income determines the percentage of child care expenses that can be claimed for credit (between 20 and 35%). The credit is not refundable which keeps the lowest-income families from bene ting. retirement in period T r. One of the reasons for including the retirement savings motive in our model is to have a realistic amount of savings so that the potential role of female labor supply as a private insurance mechanisms is not overestimated. We use a utility function of the form u(c t ; P t ; e t ) = ct et
As we use values of > 1; we constrain 1 > 0 so that participation reduces the utility of consumption. The functional form in 1 purposefully deviates from the homothetic speci cations typically used in macro growth models that generate balanced path. Consistent with estimates from micro studies, such as Browning and Meghir (1991), utility is not homothetic. Moreover, given that the focus of this paper is in understanding the reaction of labour supply to di erent types of incentives, we did not want to build into the speci cation of the utility function a restriction on the response of labour supply to changes in wages. Consumption is equivalised by the factor e t which depends on the age and number of children.
We use the McClements scale to determine e.
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The intertemporal budget constraint has the form
where A are beginning of period assets, R is the interest rate, F the xed cost of work which depends on a t; the age of the rst child born to the female. Female earnings are given by y f t ; and husband earnings are given by y m t . In any period, individuals are able to borrow against the minimum income they can guarantee for the rest of their lives. Notice that this feature di erentiates our model substantially from those used by Eckstein and Wolpin (1988) and van der Klaauw (1996) who rule out any borrowing or saving. As we discuss below, this di erence can be substantial. 9 We denote the child care units needed by a family whose rst child is age a t by G(a t ) and the price of each unit of child care by p. Therefore, the total child care cost faced by a household when females participates in the labor market is given by
8 According to the McClements scale, a childless couple is equivalent to 1.67 adults. A couple with one child is equivalent to 1.9 adults if the child is less than 3, to 2 adults if the child is between 3 and 7, 2.07 adults if the child is between 8 and 12 and 2.2 adults if the child is between 13 and 18. As we mention in the text, we assume that each couple has two children who arrive at a predetermined age and leave at age 18.
The function G(a t )will be estimated from expenditure data of households with children of the relevant ages. Both female and male earnings, y 0 > 0; 1 < 0 We think of as the permanent depreciation in human capital associated with non-participation, as discussed and estimated by Mincer and Polachek (1974) and Mincer and Olfek (1982) . We do not model direct investment in human capital (such as schooling decisions or on the job training), which are extensively discussed in Mincer and Polachek (1974) and Mincer and Olfek (1982) .
The process of human capital accumulation is important to our model. One issue is whether the increase in human capital associated with working diminishes with the level of human capital. A related issue is whether this increase depends on age. Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) and van der Klaauw (1996) assume that the increase in human capital diminishes with the level of human capital. Olivetti (2000) assumes the increase in human capital diminishes with age, but not with the level of human capital. As in Olivetti, we assume that the increase in human capital depends on age only, with the increase in human capital decreasing with age if 1 < 0. We calibrate the depreciation rate and the human capital function parameters so that our model match certain moments of the data that we discuss below.
Since we assume men always work, male earnings are given by ln y 
We estimate directly from the data the parameters of the human capital accumulation function for males given above. As for married men labor market participation is very high, selection bias in this estimation is expected to be small. In each period, if the woman chooses to participate, the value function is given by
u (c t ; P t = 1; e t ) + E t 
If she chooses not to participate, the value function is given by, 
The decision of whether or not to participate in period t is determined by comparing V The participation choice and the consumption choice in t determines the endogenous state variables (assets and human capital) at the start of the next period. The nonconcavity in the value function induced by the discrete participation decision is smoothed out by the presence of su cient uncertainty. We check that this holds in the numerical solution of the problem, as discussed in the appendix.
One of the main di erences between our model and those estimated in the literature by Eckstein and Wolpin (1988) and van der Klaauw (1996) is the inclusion of saving and borrowing as a choice variable. This has a number of implications: rst, the utility cost of non-participation is lower in our model because consumption can be smoothed over time through saving. The presence of husband earnings means consumption is not as variable as the wife's wage income, but, without savings, consumption will still be highly sensitive to the participation choice because of the budget constraint. Since we observe periods of non-participation, a model without saving that tries to match the data on non-participation would imply the direct utility bene t of non-participation to be large, the negative impact on future wages of non-participation to be small or child-care costs to be large. Without these features, individuals would not be willing to accept the consumption loss in a given period and the variability in consumption across periods implied by non-participation. On the other hand, if individuals are able to save or borrow, the income loss in a particular period associated with non-participation in that period can be spread over the life-cycle. However, the papers by Eckstein and Wolpin and by Van de Klaauw allow for other mechanisms for smoothing, such as intertemporal non-separabilities, that we do not include in our model.
While allowing individuals to save adds an element of realism to our model, the assumption that they can borrow up to the present discounted value of their minimum earnings can be an unrealistic assumption. It is possible that individual households are prevented from borrowing large amounts at the current interest rate because of imperfections in credit markets. The presence of such borrowing constraints is likely to have a particularly strong e ect on young households. In Attanasio et al. (2005), we use the model in this paper to show how much borrowing constraints matter for female participation.
Baseline Parameters and Simulations
In this section, we discuss the choice of the parameters we use in our baseline model. We then show the life-cycle pro les implied by these parameters. We calibrate the model parameters to t the life cycle pro le of cohort 2. In the next section, we carry out comparative statics exercises and discuss the implications of changing some key baseline parameters for female participation.
Baseline parameters
We take some of the parameters of our model directly from pre-existing estimates and direct estimates from the data. We calibrate the remaining parameters to match some moments of the data. We start by discussing the rst set. Table 5 , we report the set of`exogenous' parameters we use in our baseline simulations. We x the interest rate to equal the average real return on three monthly T-bill at .015 We assume a discount factor equal to 0.98, which implies a discount rate slightly higher than the interest rate. In the utility function (1), the coe cient of relative risk aversion, ; is set to 1.5. This value is consistent with the evidence on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in the US provided by Attanasio and Weber (1995).
External parameters In
As mentioned above in our model women di er in the age at which they have their rst child. We assume that 12% of women never have a child, 41% have the rst of their two children at age 24 and 47% have their rst child at 29. We have calibrated these proportions on the distribution of maternity age of women belonging to cohort 2 in the PSID. All women in our model begin life at age 22 with zero assets. The deterministic component of the men earning process is estimated from the PSID. Both the innovations to male earnings and those to female wages are assumed to have a unit root, consistent with the evidence on men produced by MaCurdy (1983) and Abowd and Card (1989) . The degree of persistence of income shocks is important. If shocks were i.i.d. but with a high variance per period (this is necessary to keep the variance of lifetime earnings constant), participation is high across the life-cycle as individuals face large amounts of ongoing uncertainty. With persistent shocks, the uncertainty translates into heterogeneity late in life. These considerations are important because of the assumption of the absence of persistence of shocks in Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) and van der Klaauw (1996) .
The standard deviation of the innovation for husband's earnings is assumed to be 0.13. This number is similar to the variances estimated using PSID data by Carroll and Samwick (1997) or Low, Meghir and Pistaferri (2005)). There is not much evidence on the variability of female wages and/or earnings. Assuming that the variance of female wages innovations is the same as that for men earnings, we compute the implied coe cient of variations of female earnings, which comes out at 0.69. Obviously, this is very di erent from the coe cient of variation of men earnings, because of endogenous participation. However, it turns out to be quite similar to the value of 0.65 reported by Hyslop (2001) for female earnings. 10 In addition, for our baseline cohort in the PSID, the same coe cient of variation is not very di erent at 0.77. We therefore settled for the value of 0.13. We assume that the correlation coe cient between the two shocks (for husband and wife) is equal to 0.25 as estimated by Hyslop (2001) .
There are two components to child care cost: the function G(a t ) and the price p: We estimate the function G(a t ) directly from data. In particular, for households where the mother is working, we regress total childcare expenditure on the age of the youngest child, the age of the oldest child, the number of children and a dummy that equals one if the youngest child is 0. The shape G(a t ) can be derived from the coe cients of this regression function, considering that in our model all women with children have two of them and at the same interval. This implies that the child care cost can be expressed as a function of the age of the oldest child. As we discuss below, we calibrate the price p using our model. Length of Working Life r 40 Table 5 : Exogenous Parameters
Calibrated parameters In the top panel of Table 6 we report the set of parameters that we have calibrated to match certain statistics of the data. In the bottom panel, we report the value of the statistics we chose to calibrate in the data, along side their value in the calibrated model implied by the chosen parameters. All the statistics refer to cohort 2. Obviously, when one changes one parameter, all simulation statistics change so that the mapping suggested in the columns of Table 6 is only approximate and indicative. However, it is clear that some parameters are crucial in determining certain features of the simulations.
The parameters of the model we calibrate are: the utility cost of working (given by 2 parameters), the depreciation rate (de ned as the annualized rate of change of the wage of a woman exiting employment compared to the wage she gets on re-entry), the initial wage gender gap, the returns to experience and the price of child-care. The moments we are matching in the data are: the average participation over the life-cycle, the average participation of women who have no children under 18, the average participation rate by mothers with children aged under 3, 11 the observed wage gender gap (in this case we focus only on women aged under 40), the depreciation rate and the wage growth. We compute these statistics using women aged between 25 and 50 and belonging to cohort 2.
It should be stressed that in computing all the statistics that involve female labour market outcomes, we implictly control for the selection process that is Table 6 : Calibration Process of Model Parameters operative in our model, that is both in the data and in the simulations, the women on which these statistics are computed are a selected sample. In particular: (i) we match the observed depreciation rate for those women exiting the labor market before 32 and coming back before 40; (ii) we match the observed wage gender gap for those women aged under 40; (iii) we match the wage growth of wages for women who have worked 90% of their lifetime at each age for 2 groups of women: those who are younger than 35 and those who are older than 35. For wage growth we match, for the two groups of women, the parameter 1 in the following regression log y
The calibrated price of child care is equal to 12067. This implies that the child care cost associated with a new born is 64% of mean earnings for a 30 year old woman who worked continuously prior to childbirth.
In Table ? ? we calculate the net present value of the income path from taking a spell out relative to not doing so. If there were no utility cost of participation and no uncertainty, this opportunity cost of non-participation would determine the size of the xed cost necessary to induce that spell of non-participation. Individuals may choose to work early on despite current earnings being less than the xed cost if there is a signi cant return to experience and they are able to nance this investment through borrowing. Returns to experience in our baseline are greater than those estimated in Eckstein and Wolpin (1988) and van der Klaauw (1996). As discussed above, the estimates of the cost of being out of the labour force in those papers are likely to be underestimates of the true costs: they are determined by the fraction of individuals who do not participate and, given that consumption equals income in those models, it is hard in a dynamic programming model to induce individuals to choose not to participate unless the cost of doing so is small. The table shows the fraction of lifetime earnings that are lost in each scenario. These calculations assume no uncertainty over wages and depreciation rates are set to zero.
The 2 parameter re ects the direct utility cost of participating and it takes a value equal to 0.019 in our baseline. We could alternatively have a xed cost In the data, a fraction of women return to part-time work in between the birth of the rst and second child. Reported median duration is calcilated for return to full-time work Table 8 : Other Statistics in the Baseline Simulations of working in the budget constraint that is not child related. The 1 parameter re ects the reduction in the utility of consumption caused by participation. Since > 1 and 1 > 0; the marginal utility of consumption is greater when participating than when not participating, in other words, consumption and participation are complements in utility, as in van der Klaauw. Parameter 1 =0.00215 in our baseline corresponds to a utility cost of participation equivalent to 0.5% of consumption.
Baseline life cycle pro les
Given the parameters in Table 6 we can simulate the model and generate life cycle pro les for the variables of interest. We can also calculate statistics that have not been used in the calibration to compare to the data of cohort 2. We focus our discussion on the labour supply behaviour of women who di er in their fertility experience. In particular, we consider childless women, young mothers (age 24 at childbirth) and older mothers (age 29 at childbirth). Table 8 reports statistics for participation for the three groups of women in the model and compares these to the data. Figure 14 shows corresponding participation pro les. The simulated model is able to match not only the participation statistics that were used in the calibration but also other salient statistics describing female labour market behaviour: rst, as in the data, young mothers in the model participate less than older mothers; second, we match exactly the participation rates of mothers of older children. Further, median duration out of employment is 7 years in the model and 7 years in the data. 12 We report the statistic from the data for duration until return to full-time employment. In the data, as reported in Table ? ?, duration until return to any emplyment is faster, often because women return to work temporarily between the birth of their children. The e ects of these short return spells are discussed in Mincer and Olfek (1982) . Figure 15 shows life-cycle pro les of log earnings averaged over women who are participating, by fertility experience. The gure shows that following childbirth only the more productive mothers remain in the labour force. This explains the hump in the earnings pro le which occurs at di erent ages for mothers with di erent maternity ages. The gure also shows how child care costs compare to realised earnings. It is di cult to compare these implications to the data directly because, given our sample sizes, we cannot restrict to women who have exactly the same maternity experience as women in our model. This picture illustrates the potential importance of the selection bias induced by the participation decision following childbirth. This obviously has implications for estimates of the return to experience and of wage dispersion that are based on observed wage data.
The importance of selection biases in the estimation of earning pro les was already suggested by the dynamics in Figure 10 in Section 2, which plotted the average wages of all working women and of women who have worked 90% of their adult life against age. In Figure 16 , we show that the same pro les for our simulated data resemble closely the pro les for cohort 2. We plot the simulated pro le of assets by age up to age 40 in Figures 17 and  18 for young and old mothers, respectively. We see thathat individuals save prior to the arrival of children (this is specially clear in the case of old mothers), then run down savings and borrow while their children are young. For the average non participant this is to nance their consumption in anticipation that, at least some of them, will participate once children reach school age. For participants, this is to nance child care costs and consumption. As they get older, debt is paid o , and then individuals save to cover periods of non-participation at the end of the life-time..In interpreting these pictures we need to keep in mind that the composition of women participating and not participating changes over time, especially after the second child reaches age 5. This composition e ect explains the jump in the asset pro le for non-participants at age 31 for younger mothers and at age 36 for older ones. The women who stay out of employment even after children reach school age are those who are relatively wealthy.
Explaining changes in female participation
In this section, we describe the impact that various changes in the economic environment have on female participation over the life-cycle. Our main aim is to establish what are the most likely explanations for the change in the shape of the life cycle pro les of cohort 3 relative to cohort 2. We do not consider di erences across cohorts in the number of children or in the age at chilbirth as strong candidates to explain the change in labour supply because of the evidence in Section 2. Instead, we will focus on changes in child-care costs, return to experience and the level of the wage. For each of these variables, we simulate the model inputing di erent changes in the variable of interest and compare the resulting labour supply behaviour to that of cohort 3. The statistics reported in this section di er from those used in the calibration: rst, we report statistics only for women age 40 or under because we do not have more recent data for cohort 3. Second, we report more disaggregated statistics on participation showing how participation di ers by the age of child and by age at childbirth and we compare these statistics to the data.
Child-care Costs
In Table 9 we show how participation reacts to the price of child-care in our model. The rst two columns of the Table report the statistics of interest for Cohort 2 and for the baseline simulation. In columns 3 to 5 we decrease the cost of child care p by 5%, 10% and 15%. Given the evidence in section 2 on the evolution of child care workers pay relative to other workers, a decrease in 15% is not unreasonable. The nal column reports the statistics from the data for cohort 3. We see that decreasing child care costs by 15% increases total participation by 8% points, which compares with an increase of 12% points in the data. When we look at the three groups of women in our simulations, we nd that a 15% decrease in child care cost is able to generate changes in each of 
Returns to experience
As suggested by Olivetti (2001) , an increase in the returns to experience may a ect labour supply. In Table 10 we report the same participation statistics reported in Table 9 for di erent returns to experience. As with Table 9 , in the rst two columns we report the statistics for Cohort 2 and for the baseline simulation, while in the last column we report the statistics for cohort 3. In columns 3 to 5, we report the statistics for simulations where we increase the parameters of the human capital accumulation function. In particular, we increase 0 so that the implied increase in the marginal returns to experience averaged along the life cycle is about 5%, 25% and 40%.
14 An increase of 25% is similar to the increase estimated by Olivetti (2001) . An increase in the return to experience by 5% has very small e ects on the participation of mothers or any women. When the increase is as large as 25%, the participation rate of young mothers increases by 12% points, while participation of older mother increases by 11% points. This compares to increases of 22% points and 17% points between cohort 2 and 3 for the two groups and is less than the increase obtained with a 15% fall in childcare costs. Only if we increase the return to experience by 40% do we get an increase for older mothers that is as large as that observed in the data. For younger mothers, even such a large increase does not yield the increase we witness in the data. One explanation of this maybe the fact that an increase in the return to experience does not only tilt the wage age pro le but also increases the amount of resources available to our households. Moreover, a large increase in the return to experience allows women who take time out of employment to raise children to make up for the lost years more quickly.
Turning to the changes in earning pro les, we see that the increse in the return to education does not explain the changes in wage growth, although it performs marginally better than the previous experiment. For gender gap and depreciation we do not get any substantial changes.
Returns to Experience
Coh 2 Base +5% +25% +40% 
Wage Level
The nal experiment we perform consists in increasing the level of female wages. This experiment is interesting in its own right but also because it is informative about the size of wealth e ects operating in the case of the increase in the return to experience. As with the other tables, we report the baseline gures and the data for the two cohorts of interest. We also report the results we get by increasing the wage level by 5%, 15% and 25%. The labour supply of mothers does increase substantially. Indeed an increase in the wage between 10 and 15% generates an increase in participation of both young and older mothers similar to what we observe in the data. The similarity of this result with that obtained with a change in child care cost is intuitive: what matters for participation is the ratio between wages and child care costs. However, an increase in the level of wages generates an increase in the participation rate across all women: when increasing the wage level we observe an increase in the participation of mothers of older children (aged 4-18) of 12% points compared to the increase of 8% points in the data that was matched exactly by the experiment of a fall in child care costs. 
Implications and Conclusions
It is now time to take stock of the simulations performed in the previous section and discuss what can be learned from them in terms of explaining the di erences in the behaviour of the Hillary Clinton and Oprah Winfrey cohorts that we discussed in Section 2. We simulate three changes to important determinants of female labour supply. In particular, having matched the behaviour of the Hillary Clinton cohort in our baseline simulations, we show how the life-cycle pro le of female labour supply changes when we decrease the cost of child care relative to earnings, when we increase the returns to experience, and when we increase the level of female wages. In Section 2 we presented some evidence on the importance of these changes over the relevant period. While it is hard to measure the magnitude of some of these changes, our simulations serve the purpose of evaluating the relative merits of altenative explanations of the observed changes in female labour supply. Having done that, and in particular, having determined the magnitude of changes in the environment needed to cause the observed shift in labour supply behaviour, we can assess how realistic they are.
First, we observe that a 15% decrease in child care costs would be needed to explain the increase in participation of mothers of young children from the observed 0.47 rate in the Clinton cohort to the observed 0.67 in the Winfrey cohort. Remarkably, this change also explains the di erential shifts in the labour supply of younger and older mothers and the change in participation by mothers of older children. We presented evidence showing that changes in childcare costs of this magnitude have occured.
Second, an increase in the return to experience that is similar to that estimated in the data by Olivetti (2001) is not able to increase the participation rate of mothers by the amount we observed in the data, particularly for younger mothers. More substantial increases in the return to experience increase labour supply somewhat but additional increases imply wealth e ects that dampen the improved incentives to work.
Third, an increase in the level of wages does increase substantially the labour supply of women. This is consistent, within the model, with the large e ects seen for a decrease in the cost of child care: it is the ratio of wages to child labour costs that is relevant. However, an increase in the level of wages increases the overall labour supply of women by more than what we observe in the data and in a way that does not occur when we decrease child care costs. In particular, a wage increase leads to increases in the participation of non-mothers and of mothers of older children that are larger than observed in the data.
This evidence leads us to conclude that a change in the cost of childcare was probably one of the main factors in explaining the increase in female labour supply. This does not mean, however, that our model can predict all aspects of the data. In particular, none of the simulations we ran could explain the increase in the rate of growth of wages, the reduction in the observed gender wage gap or the increase in what we label the`depreciation of human capital' We think that this failure is probably explained by factors, such as aggregate trends in productivity, that are not present in our model. When we discussed the evidence on the increased return to experience that can be estimated from actual data, we showed the di culty of separating age and time e ects without making strong assumptions about the presence of aggregate trends. We can only identify substantial shifts in returns to experience across our cohorts if we assume that time e ects have no trend. However, if we make the opposite assumption of no age e ects and therefore no changes in the return to experience, we would interpret the trends in Figure 10 as pure time e ects possibly induced by technical progress. This could also give rise to the change in wage growth observed across cohorts that none of our experiments were able to capture.
We have not explicitly investigated the e ects of other factors that are, in all likelihood, important determinants of female labour supply. Those that immediately come to mind are changes in fertility (both in number of children and their timing), changes in home production technology, changes in divorce and marriage rates and changes in education. The reason for these omissions is that these factors have not changed much between cohort 2 and cohort 3. However, they are probably very important, instead, in explaining the shift from cohort 1 to cohort 2, as argued recently by Greenwod et al. (2005) for home production technology.
The results of this paper are very suggestive and open further lines of enquiry. Two important issues that we have ignored are the incentives to accumulate human capital and the possibility of working part time. Both these issues again, can be very important in the early part of the life cycle, where most of the action happens both in the data and in our simulations. It would therefore be worthwhile incorporating these issues in more realistic incarnations of the model. the life-cycle. In particular, the unconditional variance of the permanent component must increase linearly with age, with the slope given by the conditional variance of the permanent shock.
Value functions are increasing in assets A t but they are not necessarily concave, even if we condition on labour market status in t: The non-concavity arises because of changes in labor market status in future periods: the slope of the value function is given by the marginal utility of consumption, but this is not monotonic in the asset stock because consumption can decline as assets increase and expected labour market status in future periods changes. By contrast, in Danforth (1979) employment is an abosrbing state and so the conditional value function will be concave. Under certainty, the number of kinks in the conditional value function is given by the number of periods of life remaining. If there is enough uncertainty, then changes in work status in the future will be smoothed out leaving the expected value function concave: whether or not an individual will work in t + 1 at a given A t depends on the realisation of shocks in t + 1. Using uncertainty to avoid non-concavities is analogous to the use of lotteries elsewhere in the literature.
The choice of participation status in t is determined by the maximum of the conditional value functions in t: In our solution, we impose and check restrictions on this participation choice. In particular, we use the restriction that the participation decision switches only once as assets increase, conditional on permanent earnings and experience. When this restriction holds, it allows us to interpolate behaviour across the asset grid without losing our ability to determine participation status. We therefore de ne a reservation asset stock, R t to separate the value function and the choice of consumption made when participating from the value function and choice of consumption made when not participating.
Solving for the reservation asset stock serves two purposes: one, it makes it easier in the solution to allow for the xed cost in the budget constraint (rather than having an unconditional policy function with a discontinuity); two, it provides an additional check on our numerical solution: the reservation asset stock should be increasing in the wage rate. A su cient condition for this to be unique is that the conditional value functions be concave. This is not true in general, as discussed above, but uniqueness can be achieved by having enough uncertainty to make the conditional expected value function concave. Even when the conditional value functions are not concave, however, we can have a unique reservation asset stock, particularly if individuals are impatient enough: impatience means that individuals prefer periods of non-participation to be earlier in the life-cycle and so avoids indi erence about the timing of leisure which can generate non-uniqueness.
In solving the maximisation problem at a given point in the state space, we use a simple golden search method. We solve the model and do the calibration assuming this process is appropriate and assuming there is a unique reseration asset stock for each point in the state space. We then check that the results in our baseline case are una ected when we use a global optimising routine, simulated annealing, and we do not assume a unique reservation asset stock. It is worth stressing that there are parameter values for which the techniques we used do not work. In particular, the assumption of a unique reservation asset stock fails as the variance of shocks gets su ciently low and if households have discount rates very close to the interest rate.
Labour supply and wages by education
In this appendix, we look at employment rates and wages by education to reinforce the ndings in section 2. We divide married women into two groups, those with more than high school education and those who are at most high school graduates. Figures 19 and 20 show employment rate for women with low and high education. We observe that the increase of women's employment rates is important for both educational groups and in both cases the most signi cant change is the attening of the age -participation pro le between ages 25 and 35. 
